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EDITOR'S  NOTE:  Rep.  Stephen Neal of North Carviina has intmduced House Joint Resoh&m  409, 
dim&g  the  Federa/  Reserve  to  reduce  inflation  to zem  within jive  years  and  maintain  price 
stabz’@v thereafter.  On Febmary  6,  Mr.  Block  and  thme o&r  Federai  Reseme  Bank presidents 
testz>ed in support  of the Resolution before the Subcommittee  on Domestic Monetary  Polity of tire 
U.S.  House  of Representatives  Committee on  Banking,  Finance,  and  Urban  Af/‘airx  Following 
is Mr.  Blacks  testimony. 
Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  delighted  to  be  here  today 
to testify  in favor of H.J.  Resolution  409,  which  would 
instruct  the  Federal  Reserve  to  achieve  price  stability 
within  five  years.  I believe  passage  of  the  Resolu- 
tion  by  Congress  would  significantly  improve  the 
overall  framework  in which  monetary  policy  is con- 
ducted  and  increase  our  chances  of  achieving  price 
stability  and  steady  economic  growth  in  the  years 
ahead. 
I have  been  associated  with  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of Richmond  for over  thirty-five  years  and have 
attended  at least  some  of the  meetings  of the  Federal 
Open  Market  Committee  for  about  thirty  of  those 
years.  For  seventeen  years,  I have  been  the  Rich- 
mond  Bank’s official representative  at those  meetings. 
My  work  with  the  Committee  has convinced  me  that 
price  stability  should  be  the  primary  long-run  objec- 
tive  for monetary  policy  and that  the  Federal  Reserve 
can  make  its  greatest  contribution  to  the  economic 
health  of  our  country  through  pursuit  of  that 
objective. 
The  Case  for  Making  Price  Stability  the 
Overriding  Objective  of  Monetary  Policy 
The  case  for  making  price  stability  the  primary 
objective  of monetary  policy  is a compelling  one,  Mr. 
Chairman.  First,  inflation  imposes  pervasive  costs  on 
our  society,  especially  if it  is not  anticipated.  Infla- 
tion  distorts  the  signals that  prices  send  in our market 
economy,  which  leads  to  serious  inefficiencies  in the 
allocation  of resources.  These  distortions  and  ineffi- 
ciencies  reduce  the  long-run  rate  of  growth  of  the 
economy  below  its  full  potential.  In  a similar  way, 
inflation  disrupts  the  functioning  of  our  financial 
markets  and  on  balance  discourages  saving  and 
investment.  Moreover,  its  volatility  increases  the 
risk  associated  with  particular.  business  decisions. 
Finally,  inflation  redistributes  income  and  wealth  in 
arbitrary  ways,  which  creates  dissatisfaction  within 
the  social  and  economic  groups  whose  incomes  and 
wealth  are  adversely  affected. 
Although  many  of these  costs  are hard  to measure, 
there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  they  are  sig- 
nificant  in  the  aggregate.  First,  there  is  a negative 
correlation  between  inflation  and  long-term  economic 
growth  across  different  countries.  Second,  our 
citizens  have  repeatedly  made  it  clear  that  they 
strongly  dislike  inflation.  Finally,  persistently  high 
rates  of  inflation  in peacetime  in the  U.S.  have  fre- 
quently  been  associated  with  relatively  low  rates  of 
real  economic  growth. 
Inflation  is still a major  problem  today,  despite  the 
belief  in some  quarters  that  it has  been  conquered. 
It disturbs  me  to  hear  people  talk  as if inflation  were 
dead  when  we  have  been  experiencing  an  under- 
lying  inflation  rate  in the  neighborhood  of  4  to  4% 
percent.  The  current  rate  is clearly  an improvement 
over  the  very  high  rates  prevailing  in the  late  1970s 
and  early  198Os,  but  it is not  a particularly  low  rate 
when  judged  by  longer-run  historical  standards.  As 
you  may  know,  the  consumer  price  index  rose  at an 
average  annual  rate  of  1.5 percent  between  the  end 
of the  Korean  War and  1965.  What  is now considered 
by  some  to  be  moderate  inflation  was  regarded  as 
an intolerable  condition  only  a few  years  ago.  Presi- 
dent  Nixon  imposed  a comprehensive  price  and wage’ 
control  program  on  the  economy  in  August  1971 
when  the  rate  of  inflation  was  even  lower  than  the 
rates  of  recent  years. 
Moreover-and  I believe  this  is one  of the  critical 
issues  addressed  by  the  Resolution-inflation  may 
well  reaccelerate  in  the  absence  of  a clear  signal  to 
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Reserve’s  commitment  to  reduce  it further.  As  we 
all know,  the  System  is under  constant  pressure  to 
“do something”  with  monetary  policy  in the  short  run 
to improve  the  economy’s  performance  or deal with 
some  other  current  problem.  In  the  past  ‘such 
pressures  have,  at  times,  led  the  System  to  take 
actions  that  have  eventually  contributed  to  an  ac- 
celeration  of inflation.  There  is obviously  a risk  that 
history  will repeat  itself  unless  an  effort  is made  to 
reduce  these  pressures. 
I  say  this  even  though  I  believe  the  present 
members  of the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee 
as  a  group  are  especially  strongly  committed  to 
fighting  inflation  and  the  public  still  has  vivid 
memories  of the  rampant  inflation  of the  late  1970s 
and  early  1980s.  The  composition  of  the  Federal 
Open  Market  Committee  will  change,  and  the 
memories  of double-digit  inflation  will gradually  fade, 
but  the  pressures  on  the  Federal  Reserve  to  make 
its  monetary  policy  decisions  on  the  basis  of short- 
run  considerations  without  adequate  regard  for  the 
long-run  inflationary  consequences  of.  these  decisions 
will  surely  persist  in  the  years  ahead. 
One  problem  the  Federal  Reserve  faces  in  con- 
ducting  monetary  policy  currently,  in my view,  is that 
our  mandate  is  too  broad.  A  clear  and  attainable 
objective  is  a  necessary  condition  for  the  success 
of  any  policy  strategy.  Unfortunately,  current  law 
does  not  provide  the  Federal  Reserve  with  such  an 
objective.  Instead,  our  current  mandate  instructs  us 
to  consider  a wide  range  of economic  conditions  in 
carrying  out  monetary  policy.  Specifically,  Section 
2A of the  Federal  Reserve  Act  requires  the  System 
to  take  account  of  “.  .  .  past  and  prospective 
developments  in employment,  unemployment,  pro- 
.duction,  investment,  real  income,  productivity,  in- 
ternational  trade  and  payments,  and  prices.  . . .” in 
setting  its  annual  objectives  for  the  growth  of  the 
monetary  and  credit  aggregates. 
A mandate  that  instructs  the  Federal  Reserve  to 
consider  such  a broad  range  of economic  conditions 
may  not  be  the  strongest  foundation  for an effective 
strategy  for monetary  policy.  Faced  with  the  require- 
ment’to  take  account  of all these  conditions,  policy 
choices  necessarily  are  made  in a discretionary  man- 
ner  which  gives  substantial  weight  to  current  eco- 
‘nomic  and  financial  conditions  and prospects  for the 
near-term  future.  This  approach  to policy  fosters  the 
notion  that  the  Fed  can fine-tune  the  economy  even 
though  both  actual  experience  and  much  of the  most 
important  recent  research  in macroeconomics  argue 
persuasively  to  the  contrary.  It  also  encourages 
special  interest  groups  to try to pressure  the  System 
to  pursue  the  particular  goals  they  consider  impor- 
tant.  These  circumstances  tend  to  impart  an  infla- 
tionary  bias  to  monetary  policy. 
The  Resolution  would  help  us  overcome  these 
problems  by  specifying  clearly  a  single,  feasible 
objective  for  monetary  policy  and  instructing  the 
Federal  Reserve  to  achieve  that  objective.  Price 
stability  is obviously  an appropriate  objective  for any 
central  bank.  Further,  it is a feasible  objective  since 
there  is no question  that  the  System  can achieve  price 
stability  over  the  long  run  by  controlling  the  rate  of 
growth  of  the  monetary  aggregates. 
Moreover,  I believe  price  stability  is really the  only 
feasible  objective  for  monetary  policy.  Some  might 
argue  that  increasing  long-run  economic  growth  or 
fine-tuning  economic  .activity  .in  the  short  run  are 
alternative  objectives.  Most  economists  now  agree, 
however,  that  the  long-run  rate  of  real  economic 
growth  is determined  by  nonmonetary  factors  such 
as population  growth,  increases  in productivity,  and 
the  rate  of saving  and investment.  Accordingly,  most 
conclude  that  expansionary  monetary  policies  can 
raise the growth  rate  only temporarily,  if at all. There 
is also  a growing  consensus  that  the  System  could 
make  its greatest  contribution  to long-run  economic 
growth  by fostering  price  stability  so that  economic 
decisions  could  be  made  on  the  basis  of  reliable 
information  on  both  current  and  future  prices. 
There  also  is very  little  evidence  that  the  Federal 
Reserve  can  use  monetary  policy  to  fine-tune  the 
economy  in the  short  run.  Monetary  policy  affects 
the  economy  with  both  long  and variable  lags. These 
lags,  in conjunction  with  the  inability  of economists 
to  forecast  future  economic  conditions  with  much 
confidence,  make  it very  difficult  for the  System  to 
determine  what.policy  actions  it  should  take  today 
to  produce  a particular  result  at  some  point  in  the 
near-term  future.  Moreover,  as  I  indicated  earlier, 
focusing  too  narrowly  on  relatively  short-run 
economic  conditions  tends  to give  monetary  policy 
an  inflationary  bias.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the 
Federal  Reserve  should  ignore  extraordinary  events 
such as the  stock  market  crash  in October  1987.  But, 
as  I  believe  we  demonstrated  in  late  1987,  the 
System  can  react  to  such  shocks  to  the  economy 
without  weakening  its long-run  commitment  to price 
stability. 
One  might  argue,  of course,  that  price  stability  has 
always  been  one  of the  System’s  primary  objectives 
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it  simply  instructs  the  Federal  Reserve  to  seek  an 
objective  it  is already  pursuing.  I strongly  disagree 
with  this  view.  Despite  our  best  intentions,  prices 
have  not  yet  stabilized,  as evidenced  by the  fourfold 
increase  in  the  price  level  since  1964.  Moreover, 
surveys  of  expected  inflation  consistently  indicate 
that  the  public  does  not  expect  the  Federal  Reserve 
to  make  much  further  progress  in reducing  inflation 
in  the  future,  let  alone  achieve  price  stability. 
Confidence  in  the  System’s  commitment  to  price 
stability  suffers  because  its  policy  decisions  are 
necessarily  influenced  by  numerous  other  consider- 
ations.  Passage  of  the  Resolution  would  send  an 
unambiguous  signal  to  the  public  and  the  financial 
markets  that  price  stability  is the  overriding  goal  of 
the  Federal  Reserve.  The  credibility  of the  System’s 
efforts  to reduce  inflation  would  therefore  rise.  This 
increased  credibility  would,  in turn,  lower the public’s 
expectations  of future  inflation  because  these  expec- 
tations  would  be less influenced  by the relatively  high 
inflation  rates  in  the  recent  past.  Further,  lower 
expected  inflation  would  tend  to reduce  the  costs  of 
achieving  price  stability  in  terms  of any  temporary 
loss of output  and employment.  This  reduction  would 
occur  in  part  because  producers,  when  faced  with 
monetary  restraint,  would  be more  inclined  to reduce 
prices,  or  raise  them  at  a  slower  pace,  and  less 
likely  to reduce  output  and  employment.  Similarly, 
workers  would  be more  inclined  to ,restrain their wage 
demands.  It  is worth  emphasizing  that  a truly  clear 
and unambiguous  Congressional  mandate  to eliminate 
inflation  would  play  a vital  role  in  this  process. 
Responses  to  Some  Likely  Arguments 
Against  the  Resolution 
The  major  arguments  that  will be made  against  the 
Resolution  are fairly predictable,  and  I would  like to 
say a few words  about  them.  One  argument  obviously 
concerns  the  potential  transitional  cost  of  imple- 
menting  the  Resolution.  Specifically,  some  will argue 
that  trying  to eliminate  inflation altogether  would  risk 
a recession.  It is impossible  to predict  the  future,  so 
we  cannot  dismiss  this  argument  out  of  hand.  In 
evaluating  the  argument,  however,  we  should  not 
simply  extrapolate  from  our  experience  in  dealing 
with  past  inflationary  episodes  such  as  the  ones  in 
1973-74  and  1979-81.  In those  periods,  the  System 
acted  forcefully  in a crisis  atmosphere  to reduce  the 
rate  of  inflation  over  a  short  period  of  time  and 
economic  activity  contracted  sharply.  In  contrast, 
Resolution  409  would  require  a gradual  reduction 
in  inflation  over  a  relatively  long  period  of  time 
following an extended  period  in which  substantial  pro- 
gress  has  already  been  made.  As I indicated  earlier, 
there  is good  reason  to  believe  that  passage  of the 
Resolution  would  enable  us to achieve  such  a reduc- 
tion  in  inflation  with  relatively  small  costs  to  the 
economy.  Moreover,  it  is very  important  to  weigh 
any short-run  costs  of achieving  price  stability  as pro- 
vided  by the  Resolution  against  the  longer-run  costs 
of not  achieving  it. These  latter  costs  could  be  par- 
ticularly  great  if,  at  some  future  time,  the  Federal 
Reserve  were  forced  to  follow  policies  resulting  in 
a recession  in order  to rein  in an accelerating  rate  of 
inflation. 
A  second  possible  argument  against  the  Resolu- 
tion  is  that  it  would  prevent  the  Federal  Reserve 
from  reacting  appropriately  to unanticipated  “shocks” 
to  the  economy,  such  as the  stock  market  crash  in 
October  1987.  As  I  suggested  a  moment  ago, 
however,  there  is simply  no reason  why  shocks  that 
may  affect  the  System’s  actions  in  the  short-run 
should  prevent  us from  achieving  price  stability  over 
a period  as long  as five years.  This  would  be  espe- 
cially true  if the  policy  had  credibility  in the  eyes  of 
the  general  public  and financial  market  participants, 
as I believe  it would  if the  Resolution  were  enacted. 
In  evaluating  this  argument,  it  is also  important  to 
distinguish  between  temporary  adjustments  in  our 
policy  instruments  or  intermediate  targets  2nd 
changes  in  our  ultimate  policy  objectives.  Adjust- 
ments  in  our  policy  instruments  or  intermediate 
targets  do not  require  us to alter  our long-run  objet- 
tives.  Following  the  stock  market  crash  in 1987,  for 
example,  the  System  temporarily  supplied  additional 
reserves  to  meet  the  greater  demand  for  liquidity 
induced  by the  crash,  but  this  action  did not  change 
our  longer-run  policy  goals. 
Implementation  of  the  Resolution 
A final question  regarding  the  Resolution  concerns 
how  it would  be  implemented.  I realize  the  Resolu- 
tion leaves this matter  to the Federal  Reserve.  Never- 
theless,  in  evaluating  the  Resolution  I  think  it  is 
important  to appreciate  that  from  a technical  stand- 
point  the  System  is quite  capable  of achieving  price 
stability  over  a five-year  period  and that  pursuing  this 
objective  would  require  at most  minor  changes  in our 
current  procedures.  Recent  research  both  at  the 
Board  of Governors  and  at the  Richmond  Reserve 
Bank  has provided  strong  evidence  that  the  public’s 
total  demand  for balances  included  in the  monetary 
aggregate  M2  has  remained  stable  since  the  early 
195Os,  despite  the  substantial  amount  of financial 
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fected  the  behavior  of the  components of M2,  but  it 
has  had  little  effect  on  the  behavior  of  total  M2. 
Consequently,  the  velocity  of M2,  which  is simply 
current-dollar  GNP  divided  by M2,  has not exhibited 
any trend  either  upward  or downward  in this period. 
This  constancy  in the  velocity  of M2  over  time  im- 
plies  that  the  System  could  bring  the  trend  rate  of 
inflation  to  zero  within  a five-year  period  by  gradu- 
ally lowering  the  trend  rate  of growth  of M2  to  the 
longer-run  potential  rate  of  growth  of  real  GNP. 
It  is worth  noting  that  implementing  the  Resolu- 
tion  would  not  require  any  major  change  in  the 
Federal  Reserve’s  operating  procedures,  since  we 
already  set  annual  targets  for  M2  and  announce 
them  to  Congress.  Under  the  Resolution  we  would 
simply  have  to  reduce  these  targets  gradually  and 
persistently  until  they  declined  to  the  trend  rate  of 
growth  of real  GNP,  which  is probably  somewhere 
in  the  neighborhood  of  2%  to  3  percent  a year. 
One  fairly straightforward  change  in our procedures 
that  I would  favor  would  be  to  establish  multi-year 
targets  for  M2  rather  than  the  one-year  targets  we 
currently  set.  Under  the  current  procedure,  growth 
in M2  above  or  below  the  target  for  a given  year  ‘is 
effectively  forgiven  at the  end  of the  year.  Thus,  the 
base  for  the  next  year’s  target  is the  actual  level  of 
M2  at  the  end  of  the  current  year  rather  than  the 
targeted  level.  As a result  of this  “base  drift”  in M2, 
the  price  level  can  drift  up  or  down  over  time  even 
though  the  individual  annual  M2  targets  may be  con- 
sistent  with  a zero  rate  of  inflation.  Consequently, 
I  believe  the  likelihood  of  achieving  true  long-run 
price  stability  would  be  increased  if we  eliminated 
base  drift  by  setting  a  multi-year  path  for  M2. 
This  last  point  raises  a  corresponding  point  re- 
garding  how,  in practice,  the  System  would  pursue 
the  price  stability  objective  mandated  by the  Resolu- 
tion.  One  approach  would be to seek  to hold the price 
level  at a particular  permanent  level  on average  over 
the  long  run.  A second  approach  would  be  to try  to 
maintain  the  price  level  at  its  current  level  at  any 
point  in time  irrespective  of any  past  movements  in 
the level.  Under  the first approach,  the  System  would 
act to bring prices  back  to their permanent  target  level 
if they  moved  away  from  that  level  in response,  for 
example,  to  an  unanticipated  change  in  M2  veloc- 
ity.  Under  the  second  approach,  the  System  would 
not  attempt  to  offset  the  one-time  effects  of  such 
shocks  on  the  price  level,  but  would  simply  try  to 
hold  the  price  level  at  its  then  current  level.  We 
prefer  the  first  approach,  although  we  recognize 
that  it might  take  considerable  time  to  reattain  the 
permanent  objective  in  some  instances  in  order  to 
avoid  significant  transitory  disruptions  to  real 
economic  activity.  Under  the  second  approach,  the 
price  level  would  almost  certainly  change  perma- 
nently  from  time  to time,  and  it is not  unreasonable 
to expect  that political and other  pressures  would  tend 
to  bias  these  movements  upward. 
Conclusion 
In  conclusion,  Mr.  Chairman,  I strongly  support 
Resplution  409  and  its  objective  of achieving  price 
stability  in  five  years.  The  costs  of  the  persistent 
inflation  in  this  country  are  substantial.  Without  a 
significant  change  in  the  framework  in  which 
monetary  policy  decisions  are made,  inflation is likely 
to  continue  to  be  a  serious  problem  in  the  years 
ahead,  and  it is entirely  possible  that  the  rate  of in- 
flation could  reaccelerate.  Resolution  409  goes  to the 
heart  of the  policy  problem,  which  stems  to  a large 
extent  from  the  Federal  Reserve’s  overly  broad  cur- 
rent  mandate.  Price  stability  can  and  should  be  the 
overriding  objective  of monetair  policy.  Achieving 
and  maintaining  price  stability  is the  best  contribu- 
tion  monetary  policy  can  make  to the  successful  per- 
formance  of  the  economy  over  the  long  run. 
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